We describe the emergence of multi-level policy in biodiversity governance in Belarus -a country with a strongly hierarchical and centralized political system. We analyze the biodiversity protection polices from the collapse of the Soviet Union to the present day. Our evidence is based on document analysis and in-depth interviews with representatives of key stakeholder groups, including the Belarusian government and representatives of legalized as well as banned NGOs. We observe that the importance of local government and non-state actors is increasing, as the government enters and implements more international programs and agreements. Although the changes have contributed to an improved monitoring of protected areas and are in general seen as positive by the majority of stakeholders, the policy innovation process taking place in Belarus is still very different from policy innovation processes observed in Western Democracies. Many changes are introduced on an ad hoc basis and they are not supported by the development of legal standards and procedures. Furthermore, a portion of innovative legislation exists only on paper and is never enforced. In the area of biodiversity governance, effective and urgent measures are most needed to support access to information, development of formal channels of cooperation between stakeholders, and sanctioning of mechanisms in cases of mismanagement.
and the overall style of governance has remained largely unchanged since then.
Private property in its conventional form was introduced only after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990-91. Even now however, privatized land is restricted to small domestic patches. Furthermore, the development of civil society institutions has been frozen for more than a decade. Nevertheless, the collapse of the Soviet Union and growing influences of international organizations have initiated the transformation of environmental policy and adoption of new policy instruments by national governments that involve supranational and subnational actors. There are, as yet rare, cases of bottom-up initiation of policy change. The governance standards originating from the European Union (EU), UN agencies, and other international organizations are starting to have an impact on the national legislation.
In this paper we trace the rise of the multi-level policy in biodiversity governance in Belarus. Our objective is to characterize the changes that have been introduced and the response of different administrative levels of the Belarusian governance structures, characterized by a long, highly hierarchical, tradition. We focus on the period from the collapse of the Soviet Union until the present day and we determine how changes in environmental policies emerge and develop where there is a strong centralized and hierarchical system monopolizing the political discourse.
There is a broad range of literature investigating the implementation of new policies. The literature focuses mostly on the policy innovation process in western democracies characterized by multi-actor discourse and deliberative change. For example Voβ (2007) categorizes studies of policy innovations into three groups: (i) implementation studies, which argue that policies and instruments used in the design of action programs often undergo considerable change in the process of implementation, due to political programs being drafted far away from the agencies that have to implement them; (ii) policy diffusion and transfer studies track policies as they occur across various governance domains. Explanation for patterns is sought by correlating variables of governance domains with a point in time in which a policy becomes adopted. Thus leaders and laggards of the policy adoption process are identified and conditions for the innovativeness of the policy pioneers are statistically tested. Policy transfer studies focus on the transfer of policy ideas from one focal domain to another; (iii) policy learning studies view the innovation process as an accumulation of experience and know-how across several instances of policy-making and focus more on general problem frames and policy goals embodied in beliefs and ideology than on instrumental aspects of the policy (Voβ, 2007) . Berry (1994) , using a U.S. example, furthermore argues that the primary factors leading to policy changes are internal political, social and economic characteristics. However, some policies are also adopted following changes in nearby states due to regional diffusion. National communication networks also play a certain role in this process. The interactions of state officials spread the changes from adopting states to non-adopters. Deyle (1994) draws attention to the conflict and uncertainties in policy changes. Stakeholder perceptions of the consequences of different types of policy-change influence the level of political conflict in a particular policy innovation. Uncertainty influences both the level of conflict and the choice of innovation process. The statutory authority held by an agency can also influence the choice of a particular innovation process. If a policy innovation requires new statutory powers, an initial legislative process is necessary.
Several studies discuss policy changes in top-down and centralized systems in Eastern Europe (Pickvance, 1997; Elander, 1997; Zsamboki and Bell, 1997; Banaszak and Beckmann, 2008; Bosse and Korosteleva-Polglase, 2009; Bosse, 2009; Korosteleva, 2009 ). In the context of natural resource management, KluvankovaOravska et al. (2009) show how the combination of newly emerging institutions with the ruins of communism influences the restructuring of governance from hierarchical to multilevel structures in Central and Eastern Europe. The problem of transforming former socialistic natural resource management institutions is also addressed by Gazweiler and Hagedorn (2002) and Chobotova (2007) . For Belarus however, with its special development path, the communist governance system is not in ruins to the same extent as in other former USSR countries, and the old institutions are trying to cope with the new reality and keep the status-quo. This configuration, apparently much more pronounced in this country than in Russia, Moldova or Ukraine, is the focus of this paper.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the concept of multilevel governance as applied to this study, describes the data and methods used for their collection, and gives background information about the development of the biodiversity conservation system in Belarus during the Communist time and its subsequent transition. Section 3 describes the new elements caused by the policy change paying particular attention to the introduction of market governance, increasing role of local communities, emergence of independent non-governmental organizations, and the role of international organizations and funds. Section 4 evaluates the policy changes, including the perception of change by stakeholders, level of policy conflict, uncertainties related to the policy change and possible future changes. Finally Section 5 concludes. Hodgson (2004) defines institutions for biodiversity governance as systems of established and embedded social rules that structure interactions between social and ecological systems. Individual institutions are often linked together through various types of interdependencies. Environmental changes that act as a trigger for change together with an increasing density of international institutions lead to an increase in interactions between and among institutions (Young, 2002) . The nature of cross-scale and dynamic relationships between ecological, economic and social systems, as well as processes such as natural resource use intensification and commodification of natural resources, impose multi-level challenges on linkages among different actors and institutions. In practice it implies that decision-making responsibilities are often shifted down to the local level, stakeholders are encouraged to participate in decisionmaking concerning the natural resource and, efforts are undertaken to strengthen collaboration among actors at different levels (Armitage, 2008) . Hooghe and Marks (2003) refer to the process of the dispersion of central government authority both vertically and horizontally as multi-level governance.
The analytical strategy

The concept of multi-level governance in biodiversity protection
Multi-level governance can either be related to the dispersion of governmental authority to general purpose territorial jurisdictions with non-intersecting membership or to special purpose jurisdictions tailoring membership, rules of operation, and functions to a particular policy problem. This process is also referred to as polycentric governance which describes co-existence of many centers of decision-making that are formally independent of each other (Ostrom et al., 1961; McGinnis, 1999) . A central characteristic of multi-level governance is an increasing participation of non-state actors in political decision-making (Bache and Flinders, 2005) . A few authors argue that participatory processes are a key component of multi-level governance since they contribute to legitimacy and effectiveness of governance solutions (e.g. Fiorino, 1989 , Meadowcroft, 2002 , Stirling, 2006 and can lower costs of policy implementation (Rauschmayer et al., 2009 ). Rauschmayer and Wittmer (2006) present evidence showing that participatory methods can support new resolutions to environmental management challenges. Although their uptake remains slow, they have been recognized as useful for improving multi-level governance. This is reflected in an increasing number of international environmental laws and regulations such as the Convention on Biological Diversity and Aarhus Convention (Rauschmayer et al., 2009 ).
Following Kluvankova-Oravska et al. (2009) , the emergence of multi-level biodiversity governance in transition countries is demonstrated by processes such as an increasing role for market governance, decentralization, and democratization in institutions concerned with biodiversity protection. Market governance is defined as an assignment of previously collective and state property rights to specific owners by means of restitution, sale or other forms of privatization. More broadly, market governance can be understood as a resource allocating mechanism or measurement of efficiency through monetary criteria (Pierre and Peters, 2000) . Among market mechanisms that can be applied in biodiversity governance we may find market based instruments such as taxes, fees and charges, forms of subsidies and compensations, tradable permits, and eco-labeling (Bräuer et al., 2006) . The concepts of democratization and decentralization are discussed broadly by Pickvance (1997) .
Democratization can be measured by the degree of inclusiveness of citizens and direct participation in decision-making (Pickvance, 1997) . It also refers to freedom of joining associations, freedom of expression, right to vote, eligibility for public office, right of political leaders to compete for support, access to alternative sources of information, free and fair elections, and dependence on institutions for making government policies based on votes and other expressions of preference (Dahl, 1971) .
Decentralization is characterized by empowering lower government levels through the range of functions they carry out, the degree of autonomy over how these functions are carried out, and the degree to which they are funded from their own resources (Pickvance, 1997) .
In Central and Eastern Europe, the communist period and the treatment of common property as open access, resulted in over-exploration of natural resources and inefficient institutional design of biodiversity governance (Kluvankova-Oravska and Chobotova, 2006) . Several authors argue that multi-level governance and inclusion of non-state actors may lead to reaching higher ecological standards and improved compliance with environmental legislation (e.g. Dryzek, 1997; Smith, 2003 , Sabatier et al., 2005 . Newig and Fritsch (2009) have undertaken a broad literature review analysis that suggests that a highly polycentric governance system comprised of many agencies and levels of governance yields higher environmental outputs than monocentric governance. They take more ecologically rational decisions, improve compliance with decisions, and thus achieve better outcomes and impacts in ecological terms.
In the subsequent parts of the article we will examine the drivers that lead to opening up the hierarchical and centralized environmental governance system in Belarus to non-state actors and the effects of these changes. We follow the framework of analysis developed by Kluvankova-Oravska et al. (2009) paying particular attention to (i) the emergence of market governance in biodiversity protection in Belarus, (ii) the processes of decentralization and democratization through investigating the role of local communities and local governments, and (iii) the opening of political decision-making to non-state actors. In addition, we undertake an evaluation of these policy innovations based on Deyle (1994) , who proposes to focus on the perception of change by stakeholders, the level of political conflicts, and the uncertainty that surrounds the policy change. As Deyle (1994) argues, the level of public controversy about the new policy influences the legitimacy of the process and increases the likelihood of legal challenge by one interest or another. The uncertainty (e.g. attributed to scientific measurement and evaluation or technological complexity underlying alternative policies) aggravates the tendency towards conflict among stakeholders.
Data and methods
In order to investigate the policy change process in Belarus we carried out a literature review and 14 in-depth interviews. The literature reviewed included national and international scientific publications, reports, planning documents, and decisions and regulations of governmental and international agencies involved in biodiversity conservation in Belarus. During our literature review we identified key stakeholders and organizations involved in the development of biodiversity conservation policies or biodiversity management, and/or affected by management measures at national parks, in particular at Belavezhskaya Pushcha. Afterwards, we arranged appointments and carried out in-depth interviews with those willing to talk to us officials from the A detailed list of interviewees is presented in Table 1 . Most of interviews were carried out in July 2008, however, in a few cases we completed the interviews a few months later depending on the availability of our interviewees and our ability to travel Central and Eastern Belarus all the privately and community owned land and forests were nationalized immediately after the communists took control.
There is a large body of literature about the history of biodiversity conservation in the Soviet Union (e.g. Weiner, 1999; Mnatsakanian, 1992) . The first protected area in Soviet Belarus, Biarezinsky Reserve (Zapavednik) was established in 1925. For this, 30 farms were removed from the protected area in 1928-30 (Stavrovsky and Kovaliov, 1996) , although land use and property conflicts were not officially reported. There has always been tension between different governmental institutions sharing in the use of nature resources and environmental protection. The growth of the socialistic economy was an absolute priority, as it was considered important not only to support growing welfare costs and military expenses, but also to demonstrate the superiority of the socialist social and economic model. Ministries and government agencies had always put pressure on environmental resources. After the Second World War, when both the national economy and general population urgently needed substantial supplies of construction materials, the Biarazinsky
Reserve became an arena of large-scale logging operations. In 1951, on an initiative of the USSR Minister of Forestry, the reserve was abolished and renewed only in 1959. The Belavezhskaya Pushcha National Park, although it was recognized and sustained as a natural protected park, had been drastically modified and transformed into a game reserve extensively used by top party officials (Kozulko, 2005) .
The situation improved slightly by the mid 1970s when it was firmly established that natural protected areas were sites for conservation, research and learning, and the government did not make serious attempts to use them for other purposes. Most reserves possessed some tourist infrastructure, but this was not well developed. Principles of management were in an early stage of development until the mid 1970s, and since then they have not substantially changed. Table 2 presents detailed profiles of existing categories of protected areas in Belarus.
The only quasi non-governmental actors involved in environmental decisionmaking in the Soviet times were researchers, since universities and research institutes were controlled by the Party. The basing of all major decisions on scientific evidence was deeply rooted in the technocratic Communist ideology. "Wise" use of nature was opposed to the capitalist profit-driven ways (Mnatsakanian, 1992) . Scientists have always been consulted before new decisions and policies on biodiversity conservation are adopted, although this has tended to become ritualized rather than actually consultative. In the Soviet decision-making process, the USSR Academy of Science and its regional branches were very important institutions, and partially substituted the role NGOs play in western societies.
In 1990 land property rights were re-established in Belarus (Land Code, 1990 ;
Act on the Land Property Rights, 1993) . However the size of land plots and eligible ways of using them were restricted. The situation has not changed much since then, and in the 2 nd National Referendum in November 1996, any further developments of the land market were banned by an overwhelming majority of voters (Sakovich, 2005) . Under the current legislation and administration practices, land can only be privatized for limited agricultural use, and large plots can only be given away under long-term rent. Privately owned land is allowed in nature protected areas, with exception of zones of strict protection in Zapavedniks and National Parks, but its use is restricted in many ways. Although the legislation guarantees compensation for such restrictions, evaluation and payment procedures have not been developed, and therefore compensation is not provided. The land restitution never took place in Belarus, and it is not expected to happen in the foreseeable future.
The environmental protection in the country is coordinated overall by the (2010) 3. Characteristics of the policy change
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection (Ministry of Environment
Introduction of Market Governance
After the political transformation, the Soviet economy collapsed and the financing of protected areas decreased dramatically. From 1991, when the Belarusian state emerged, markets became a necessity for the management of protected areas in order to survive. An emphasis was on timber production and tourism, including hunting.
These activities were however, kept within limits set up by relevant legislation where possible.
In 1994 Compensation schemes are new elements of market governance that appeared after the change and separation from the Soviet Union. According to the new legislation, damages made by protected species are subjected to compensation.
Nevertheless, due to gaps in the executive law, according to the knowledge of our interviewees, compensation was never paid. As pointed out by an interviewee from the Bioresource Research Centre, "it is only written that losses should be compensated, but there are no working mechanisms, nobody even tried to do it".
Increasing Role of Local Communities
Public environmental awareness is increasing due to easier access to information since the early 1990s (e.g. Internet, satellite TV channels etc), increased education level, and the rise in private property. Property ownership improves perception of the value of the environment. Big disasters, such as Chernobyl, and their long-term negative consequences have also played a role. However, there are still institutional gaps that make the organization and coordination of protest actions difficult. A professor of law from the Belarusian State University made the following statement:
"we notice that the public has a tendency to become more active, but they are not always able to use legal tools. There is a lack of a good institutional basis:
consultancies, organizations providing high-quality help […] here there is a need in the "advocacy" process, promotion of public interest."
A recent example of the increasing public environmental awareness is a campaign of people from the District of Pukhavichy (the Region of Minsk) against an agrochemical production facility (AvgustBel) to be constructed in the neighborhood.
Despite constant administrative pressure, potential danger of loss of jobs, penalties being imposed on activists etc., people continued to protest. A few thousand signatures were collected against this project (close to 50% of local electorate), a few street actions were held (broken up by the police; activists charged as participants of an unauthorized gathering), and a meeting organized by local authorities failed with locals walking out, because the officials present (including a Minister) had refused to have any dialogue. Nevertheless, the logistics of the campaign show that if nothing really extraordinary happens (though these vigorous protests are extraordinary in themselves) the facility will be constructed anyway, as apparently big economic interests are involved.
Community protests were also organized to protect the Sevastopalski City Park in Minsk (Karol, 2008) . The City of Minsk has attempted a few times to reduce the park"s area in order to make space for a highway or some other construction.
Interestingly enough, every time this happens, the locals manage to assert their rights for green surroundings. A possible explanation is that many apartments in the neighborhood have been historically occupied by, mostly retired, staff from public prosecutors offices. These former officials have a broad knowledge of the procedures and possible legal tricks that could be used and this may explain their success. It is remarkable that they usually appeal to the Act on Addresses of Citizens (1996) which guarantees that any citizens" appeals to any governmental agency shall be properly examined and answered within a firmly set term. This Act was introduced by the President and was considered by many as a populist gesture, but in this instance it has worked in the citizens" interests.
Local communities participated further in protesting against intensive logging in Belavezhskaya Pushcha (Kozulko, 2005) 
Emergence of independent non-governmental organizations
Although scientists were, for a long time, the only formal group of non-state actors included in consultations and political decision-making, this involvement increasingly became a formality: understandably, scientists want to secure governmental research funding, which in most cases is the only funding opportunity available, and they often tend to compromise. However, research departments of Special Protected Natural Areas (including national parks) are loosing their importance (Zenina, 2003; Parnikoza, 2008) .
In order to decrease the direct dependence on governmental funds and to ease access to international assistance and cooperation programs, some scientists working on internationally attractive topics, have set up non-governmental organizations or reoriented existing organizations. These are so called "research" NGOs, usually It is worth mentioning that, but for a few exceptions, NGOs usually prefer not to disclose information on their current activities and, in particular, fundraising opportunities. The same applies to the environmental research community, which is very segregated. The public, in particular older people, do not usually trust NGOs and any initiatives, actions or campaigns that take place outwit Government. That makes it somewhat difficult for NGOs to approach other stakeholder groups.
If fulfilling international agreements requires involvement of non-state actors, only scientists or government-friendly NGOs are invited, whicht makes way for "false participation." As the professor of law from the Belarusian State University stated:
"they acknowledge the [Aarhus] convention in the ministry, but at the same time they have learned mimicry. So if there is a discussion they invite loyal NGOs, or statecontrolled NGOs, and have even created a number of them for this purpose."
Increasing role of international organizations and funds
Belarus is a beneficiary of environmentally oriented international funds, such as from Practically all the interviewed stakeholders hope that the changes will empower them to gain independence from the Presidential Management Department.
They hope it would improve public awareness, the quality of the environment, and in many cases give them more income, financial support or development opportunities. 
Level of Political Conflict
As NGOs representatives report, the conflicts are, in particular, related to the division of responsibilities between various government agencies and lack of control over the Presidential Management Department. However, although the interviewees from the Ministry of Environment mention disagreement, they do not intervene in the conflicting issues and submit to the presidential administration. When we inquired into over-logging in the Belavezhskaya Pushcha, the representative of the Conservation Inspectorate interviewed, insisted that in her opinion there were no problems. The interviewee also said that according to the legislation, local government also had rights to control compliance with environmental legislation.
However, they did not do so since they lacked political will and personnel to take responsibility for it. One such conflict is between national parks" directorates tasks. On the one hand they exist to protect nature, but on the other they are under pressure to maximize income generated from the protected areas. Thus they develop agricultural, hunting and logging activates within parks and build tourist infrastructure themselves within protected areas rather than contracting with outside businessmen and tourist agencies.
A representative of Belavezhskaya Pushcha referred to this situation: "we still have a planned economy in our country. It means that we get certain plans (i.e. assignments) for earning money from higher levels. 
Uncertainties related to the policy change
Uncertainties are related to the reaction of the Presidential Management Department.
It is still a highly centralized and very much top-down system. Practically all actors bear in mind that if they are openly against the current governmental policy they may lose their jobs or be prosecuted.
An interviewee from the Bioresource Research Centre pointed out uncertainties related to the availability of the public funding both from the Presidential Management Department and from the Government. Certain categories of protected areas such as, for instance, so-called Special Protected Areas have very small budgets and they are under threat that the funding will be discontinued.
As personal connections and relationships with the President and people close to him are very important, a big source of uncertainty is related to who, will be it often happens that the project is formally implemented, the report is written, and that"s it, and the country cannot really benefit from the any tangible project outputs.
[…] We have a big problem with NGOs in our country in general, because they are almost absent.
[…] You know, there is a proverb that one head is good to have, but two heads are even better.
[…] It is always good to listen to different opinions."
Despite the fact that NGOs are not encouraged to be active, their representatives are aware, and proud of, the benefits generated by their action.
Although the Head of the Belavezhskaya Pushcha -21 st Century NGO, lost his job because of his activism, and the presidential administration keeps prosecuting him, he is proud he changed history and helped to save the National Park: "I can say now that our activity changed the history of Belavezha Forest. If there had been none of our activities the history could have been different. Due to our activities, the history has radically changed.
[…] Another activist from Minsk wrote a letter to the UNESCO about the world heritage being in danger. After that mission a group of experts were sent to control the Park, volunteers visited the Park.
[…] the UNESCO experts accepted our point of view and the Park administration was afraid to be scandalized […] ." The NGO also provided information to the Council of Europe to show that 20 recommendations they gave regarding how to maintain and conserve the Park were broken by the Park"s administration. It was an international scandal which undermined the reputation of the country, thus the administration is afraid of breaking the international agreements again.
To sum up, we believe that the increasing number of international programs as well as inclusion of non-state actors and active involvement of citizens and local governments will continue to improve monitoring and enforcement of environmental legislation. Support of international organizations, particularly for local activists who bear high personal costs of their activism, could strengthen and speed up these positive tendencies.
Conclusions
The paper analyzes an emergence of multi-level biodiversity governance in Belarus.
The country has been under a strongly centralized political regime since 1994. The Presidential Management Department took over the management of national parks and some other protected areas in the country. This seriously diminished access to information about the state of the biodiversity and management activities within the protected areas under the administration of the Presidential Management Department.
Nevertheless, mostly due to a combination of external and internal factors, we observe that the Belarusian hierarchical and centralized political system is slowly opening up and is sharing some of its powers with non-governmental actors. Nongovernmental stakeholders are becoming more involved in the decision-making and governance of natural resources.
In the article we characterize the policy changes that entail an introduction of the elements of market governance in protected areas, collaboration of protected areas" administration with local communities, an emergence of independent nongovernmental organizations, and an increasing role of international organizations and funds. In the evaluation of the policy changes we compare perceptions of the changes by different stakeholder groups, and assess the level of political conflict and uncertainties surrounding the changes. Our empirical evidence is based on literature and document review, as well as on in-depth interviews carried out with key stakeholders.
There Nevertheless, it is remarkable that, all interviewed actors perceive the multilevel policy changes as inevitable and the interviewees believe that the changes lead
to an improved quality of the environment through stronger monitoring and more transparent decision-making in protected areas. Various forms of support from international organizations are required to ensure the continuity of this process.
